BAD MEDICINE--ANTHRAX .. 12-14-98 >> From: Meryl Nass >> >> Bad Medicine >> by Conrad A. Istock >> BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, NOV-DEC 1998, PP. 21-23 >> Anthrax vaccinations of U.S troops send a politically explosive message. >> They won't provide much protection, either. >> >> THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED A YEAR ago that it would vaccinate >> all 2.4 million members of the U.S. armed forces against anthrax. Last >> August, the program got into high gear with the first large-scale >> vaccinations. Nonetheless, the anthrax vaccination program is a very bad >> ideaãone whose time should never have come. >> >> The program will encourage and intensify several "biological arrns >> races." It will also create new incentives for the manufacture and use >> of a wide variety of biological weapons. And it tells the world that the >> United States expects anthrax to be used in war, thereby eroding the >> force of the Biological Weapons Convention. Even in its primary >> purposeãprotecting U.S. military personnel against anthrax in battleãit >> is certain to fail. >> >> I do not mean to suggest that anthrax is not a nasty weapon. Its >> destructive power was accurately portrayed by Defense Secretary William >> Cohen, who explained that a quantity the size of a bag of sugar could >> kill half the people in Washington, D.C. It could produce victory in >> battle within a few days if unleashed on unprotected soldiers. But the >> biological, social, and political ramifications surrounding anthrax, or >> any other bioweapon. are far more complex than the Defense Department >> appears to realize. Although the military's vaccination program might >> seem like a wise precaution, it is in fact an ill-conceived idea likely >> to have a variety of unanticipated consequencesãin short, a >> misadventure. >> >> To illustrate just one unpleasant consequence, consider the following >> scenario: Immunized U.S. troops are locked in combat. Suddenly, the >> enemv lays a cloud of anthrax spores over the entire battlefield. Within >> a few days. U.S. soldiers are dying in droves, but no enemy soldiers >> die. >> >> Why? Because the enemy did not release the particular strain of anthrax >> U.S. biologists used to make the vaccine. Instead, they used a strain >> specifically devised to defeat U.S. immunizations. This lethal strain >> had been developed years earlier by bioweaponeers in the former Soviet >> Union, using the U.S. vaccine as a tool in the search for a resistant >> strain. (The United States originally gave the vaccine to the Soviets >> for humanitarian purposes.) The resistant strainãand again this is >> strictly a hypothetical scenarioãwas secretly transferred to other >> countries, and the enemy soldiers were protected by specific >> immunization against the Soviet creation. >> >> THE BACTERIUM BACILLUS ANTHRACIS, THE SOURCE OF THE anthrax toxin, is >> easily grown in large quantities. It is also cultured to make vaccine. >> To use anthrax as a weapon, dry spores are mixed with an aerosol >> dispersant. >> >> Anthrax spores can lie dormant for decades. possiblv for centuries. Two >> extraordinary incidents attest to their durability. In 1942 British >> bioweaponeers carried out experiments with anthrax bombs on part of the >> island of Gruinard off the northwest coast of Scotland. Viable spores >> persisted for more than 40 years until the island was decontaminated in >> 1987 by literally soaking the soil with hundreds of thousands of liters >> of formaldehyde. Test data indicated that, without decontamination, >> viable spores would have persisted until at least 2050. Then there is >> the bizarre case of the sugar lumps laced with anthrax bacilli found in >> Baron Otto Karl von Rosen's luggage when he was arrested in Norway >> during World War I on suspicion of espionage and sabotage. The spores >> were in a liquid medium in tiny sealed capillarv tubes embedded in the >> sugar. Last year-- 80 vears later-- biologists at Britain¼s Porton Down >> bioweapons detection center revived living colonies of the bacillus from >> the tube in the one lump of sugar tested. >> >> The genes for the anthrax toxin do not reside on the bacterium's main >> chromosome, but on a smaller, secondary DNA molecule called a plasmid. >> In laboratorv experiments these plasmids have been transferred from >> Bacillus anthracis to other species of bacteria. One transfer was to >> Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium widely used to control insects in >> gardens and in aerial spraying against gypsy moths. Another transfer was >> to a common soil bacterium, Bacillus cereus. The transfer of plasmids >> occurs naturally among many bacteria. Massive releases of anthrax spores >> could easilv lead, through the infection of animals, to spontaneous >> transfers of the plasmid to other bacteria as well. >> >> While anthrax does not spread from one human to another, it can >> propagate in the soil. In particular, its numbers increase in soils >> soaked with blood. And the spores from the soil can infect both humans >> and animals. >> >> Humans become infected by inhaling or swallowing spores, or by spores >> entering the body through cuts or scratches in the skin. Inhaling a >> clump of spores not much larger than a speck of dust can result in >> death. Anthrax is contracted most commonly by workers who handle wool, >> hides, or other materials from diseased animals. About 20 percent of >> untreated cases of cutaneous infection result in death. Ingested spores >> kill in 20 to 60 percent of cases; and 90 percent or more of those who >> become infected through inhalation die within a few days. >> >> The battlefield use of anthrax is plausibleãmore than a dozen countries >> have the weapon or are developing one, according to Pentagon officials. >> Until recently, laboratories could readily order anthrax cultures from >> U.S. suppliers. Before the Soviet Union abandoned its bioweapons >> program, Soviet scientists not only harvested anthrax spores in large >> quantity for use as a weapon, they also developed a highly effective >> dispersant that could quickly spread an invisible cloud of concentrated >> spores over a battlefield or a city. This dispersal technology may have >> been transferred to other countries. The United States also experimented >> with anthrax as a weapon. >> >> WOULD A VACCINATED POPULATION OF U.S SOLDIERS ON A battlefield be fully >> protected? If strains were used against which the immunization was >> completely effective, the answer would be "Yes, for a little while." >> However, sending a large number of immunized individuals into contact >> with enormous numbers of bacteria would almost certainlv reveal >> spontaneous mutants against which the vaccine was no longer effective. >> An "evolutionary arms race" would begin, pitting the human ability to >> develop new vaccines against the microbes' ability to respond through >> natural selectionãa bitter struggle we are all too familiar with in the >> case of newlv arising variants of flu viruses that repeatedly make >> previous flu vaccines obsolete. The same battle is occurring in the >> growing resistance of pathogenic bacteria to antibiotics. >> >> Based on animal testing, the U.S. vaccine does not offer protection >> against all strains of anthrax. In my scenario, an enemy used a strain >> known to break through that immunization. Thus, a "microbial-genetic >> arms race" would ensue in which newly developed strains rendered each >> previous vaccine useless. Either routine mutagenesis followed by >> selection, or genetic engineering, could be employed to produce >> resistant strains. No nation that produces bioweapons would be deterred >> by the Defense Department's use of a single vaccine. >> >> The microbial-genetic arms race could escalate wildly as potential >> combatants moved bevond anthrax to ever more deadly bacteria and >> viruses. Dozens of potential bioweapons existãweapons based, for >> example, on the plague and Salmonella bacteria, or on the smallpox, >> dengue, encephalitis, and Ebola viruses. This would be a full-blown >> "pathogen-diversity arms race." >> >> As nations interpret Defense¼s program of immunizations as an invitation >> to dabble in bioweapons, the contest is likely to spiral. Could we >> attempt to vaccinate the entire U.S. military against every conceivable >> biological weapon? We cannot. There are no vaccines for many of these >> potential agents. Furthermore, some nations may interpret the Defense >> Department's move as a sign that the United States itself is considering >> using anthrax in war, thus creating the incentive to vaccinate their >> troops while developing their own alternative biological or chemical >> weapons. >> >> Were a large quantity of anthrax spores to be dispersed, the soil, >> vegetation, local animals, equipment, supplies, clothing, and personnel >> would be contaminated with dormant spores. Spores that adhere to objects >> or collect in recesses or on fabrics will readily become airborne againã >> and recalling Gruinard and the Baron's lumps of sugar, they will remain >> viable for a long time. At some future time, and in a non-battlefield >> location, unvaccinated people are likely to die after working with >> spore-laden equipment or other war materials returned to U.S. bases. >> Animals and unvaccinated people entering the contaminated battlefield >> are also likely to dieãthe biological analog of suffering caused by >> unexploded land mines. The numbers of post-war infections could be >> enormous. >> >> No human cases of anthrax have been reported in the United States (only >> five states have reported cases in animals), but returning troops would >> bring the disease home. The saddest of specters would be that of healthy >> men and women returning home from war, only to infect their own families >> and other unprotected civilians through contaminated duffel bags and >> other paraphernalia. Could the troops and their belongings come home >> after they had been exposed? Has the Defense Department thought about >> the decontamination procedures needed to make their return safe? >> >> THE UNITED STATES CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT SIX MlLLION doses of anthrax >> vaccine, according to Defense estimates. The Defense Department >> immunizations require six shots at two-week intervals, followed by three >> more at six, 12, and - 18 months, with annual booster shots thereafter. >> Vaccinating the military will require more than the present supply, and >> though more vaccine can be made fairly quickly, a large continuing >> supply will be required as new recruits enter the armed forces and >> booster shots are administered. It will be a major undertaking. >> >> If substantial numbers of the US civilian population ever have to be >> protected against "bioterrorist" releases of anthrax, an enormous supply >> would be needed, with little guarantee that it could protect against the >> particular strain used by terrorists. >> >> We continue to live in a time of wars, with dangers from biological >> weapons probably now as great or greater than those from nuclear >> weapons. Biological weapons may pose a greater danger because they can >> be produced by "lowtech" methods, though this is somewhat less true as >> more and more genetic engineering is employed. These weapons can be >> nearly invisible. And if, unlike anthrax, contagious microbes are used >> as the basis for a weapon, they can create expanding epidemicsãlike a >> bomb that keeps on exploding. >> >> VACCINATING SERVICEMEN AND WOMEN WILL NOT EFFECTIVELY counter the threat >> of biological weapons. Instead, the Defense Department's initiative >> could erode the international strictures against the use of such >> weapons. If the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is insufficient to >> prevent the production of biological weapons, then the 140 nations party >> to that treaty need to adopt verification procedures, including on-site >> inspections. >> >> This appears to be the solution toward which the UNs recent review >> conferences on the convention are moving. Treaty members should be urged >> onward until comprehensive inspections are a reality. Instead of >> encouraging perilous biological arms races, the United States should >> join with the UN to create stronger strictures and plans for >> immediate military reprisals that would send one clear message: "If you >> use a biological weapon once, it will be the last time." >> >> Conrad A. Istock, a professor emeritus at the Department of Ecology and >> Evolutionary Biolog!y at the University of Arizona, is a permanent >> visiting fellow in the Section of Ecology and Systematics, Cornell >> University, Ithaca, New York. >> -- >> Meryl Nass, M.D. >> Parkview Hospital, Brunswick, Maine 04011 >> email mnass@igc.apc.org >> phone (207) 865-0875 >> fax (207) 865-6975 >Karin Schumacher >Vaccine Information & Awareness (VIA) >12799 La Tortola >San Diego, CA 92129 >619-484-3197 (phone/voicemail) >619-484-1187 (fax) >via@access1.net (email) >http://www.909shot.com (NVIC website) >http://www.access1.net/via (VIA website) Subject: ANTHRAX LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN CUNNINGHAM >PerksFamly@aol.com wrote: >I've just finished a letter to my Congressman, and while I think it is >pretty good, I still wanted to make sure it all has current facts and >pretty much states what information needs to be looked into. If you want >to read it, you can download it. If not, thanks anyways. Phil Perks > >238 Rayburn House Office Building >par Washington D.C. 20515-0551 > >Dear Mr. Cunningham: >My name is Phillip C. Perks and I am an Electronics Technician Second >Class in the United States Navy. I am currently stationed onboard USS >STETHEM (DDG-63) homeported in San Diego. I am writing this letter due >to concerns about the mandatory Anthrax vaccinations. I have done >extensive research on Anthrax and also on the vaccine that has been >produced for it. > >In my research, I discovered the only company that produces the Anthrax >vaccine, the Michigan Biologic Products Institute (MBPI), has come under >repeated scrutiny by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for its >facilities and procedures. In 1997, after an inspection conducted 18-27 >November, 1996, MBPI was warned by FDA\rquote s Center for Biologics >Evaluation and Research (Ref. A) that if the discrepancies found in the >FDA inspection were not corrected, their license to produce the vaccine >would be revoked. In another inspection in early 1998 (Ref. B), it >appeared that while some of the problems had been corrected, there were >still quite a large number of problems. Yet the company still had not >been shut down. MBPI was originally owned by the State of Michigan and >has been sold to a private individual. Since then it has ceased >production >while the facilities are being renovated and has been renamed BioPort. >However, that still leaves a large amount of stockpiled vaccine that is >going to be given to U.S. service members. The FDA reports on the >inspections show that there has been what appears to me as serious >violations for a company who should consistently produce a sterile >product. The FDA has made many reports of extremely poor quality >control and problems with potency and stability with some of the Anthrax >vaccine already tested. > >The Anthrax vaccine was created for use on people, such as >veterinarians, ranch workers, and textile mill workers (Ref. C). It was >licensed and approved by the FDA in 1970. The vaccine was produced and >tested to work against Anthrax that people contacted through direct skin >exposure. However, the reason behind the vaccines military use is to >protect against aerosolized Anthrax. As far as I have been able to >ascertain, there has been only one test of this vaccine against the >aerosolized Anthraxx > >In Senate Report 103-97(Ref. D), \ldblquote IS MILITARY RESEARCH >HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS\rquote HEALTH?\rdblquote dated December 4, 1994, >it states "Although the results of this study suggest the vaccine might >protect against Anthrax that has been sprayed, it is not sufficient to >prove that anthrax vaccine is safe and effective as used in the Persian >Gulf. The vaccine should therefore be considered investigational when us >ed as a protection against biological warfare." > >The use of an investigational drug requires that the person who is to >receive it must give informed consent. The Nuremberg (Ref. E) Code was >developed because of the medial experiments conducted on humans by the >Nazis during World War II. All Allied forces agreed with the terms of >the Nuremberg Code and it states " The person involved should >have the legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be >able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any >element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior >form of constraint or coercion." > >In view of the Nuremberg Code, the Anthrax vaccine should be given only >with the consent of the person who is to receive it. However, the >military is mandating that service members shall take the vaccine. If >service members refuse the vaccine, they will be charged with disobeying >a direct order and discharged from the service. This is a violation of >the Nuremberg Code and goes against the rights of the individual. > >The issues of long term effects to the vaccine have also not been >answered. According to the FDA, there have been no reports submitted to >them on the possible long-term effects of taking the Anthrax vaccine. >There are also reports of adverse reactions taking place right after the >injections have been administered. In Senate Report 103-97, there was a >small-scale survey of personnel who had received the Anthrax vaccine. >Of the 68 individuals surveyed 29 (43%) reported immediate side effects. >In view of the aforementioned concerns, I intend on refusing the Anthrax >vaccine. I fully understand my decision may jeopardize my military >career. I have been serving my country for six and a half years and was >planning on serving it longer. However, upon my refusal of the vaccine, >I may be awarded punishment, including being placed on 45 days of >restriction >(confined to the ship), reduction in rank, loss of half my pay, and >discharge from the Navy. I have a family to support, yet I am willing to >ensure that no side effects from the vaccine will endanger my health in >the future. I believe very strongly about the possible bad side effects >that the Anthrax vaccine might have on me, as it appears to have had on >other service members. > >I request your assistance to have the military rescind the mandatory >requirement for all service members to receive the Anthrax vaccination. >This will help prevent an administrative burden in an already under >manned military. I hope the references I have supplied will assist you >in finding out more about the vaccine and the conditions under which it >is being given. I would appreciate any assistance and support you can >provide. > >Thank you. >Sincerely, > >PHILLIP C. PERKS > >Warning letter to Robert Meyers, D.V.M., Michigan Biologic Products >Institute, Dated March 11, 1997. From Kathyrn C. Zoon, Ph.D of the FDA >Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research > >The FDA inspection report for Michigan Biologic Products Institute dated >2/20/98. > >Product Insert for Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed listing the proper use and >administration of the vaccine. > >Senate Report 103-97, Dated December 4, 1994, IS MILTARY RESEARCH >HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS HEALTH? > >Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under >Control Council Law No. , Vol.2, Nuremberg, October 1946-April 1949 >(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949). pp 181-182 > >*************************************************************** >Karin Schumacher >Vaccine Information & Awareness (VIA) >12799 La Tortola >San Diego, CA 92129 >619-484-3197 (phone/voicemail) >619-484-1187 (fax) >via@access1.net (email) >http://www.909shot.com (NVIC website) >http://www.access1.net/via (VIA website) >*************************************************************** >We Must Have The Freedom To Choose & Respect Everyone's Choice >*************************************************************** >Any information obtained here is not to be construed as medical >OR legal advice. The decision to vaccinate and how you >implement that decision is yours and yours alone. >*************************************************************** Subject: DR. MERYL NASS ON ANTHRAX VACCINE >From: anna nim >Dr. Meryl Nass wrote this and has given me permission to post it. > >The brief reply on the vaccine is that is unlikely to work, it has never >been tested for safety, in terms of long-term side effects, and its >manufacture is appalling. There are reasons to believe that GW vets are >chronically ill as a side effect of the vaccine, because a number who >were vaccinated but never deployed to the Gulf became ill. Jim Green, a >member of this list, is one of them. > >It probably won't work because in experimental animals, despite what DOD >says in their press releases, many strains of anthrax kill animals >immunized with this vaccine. I have copies of all the studies, and I've >created tables which list results of all the published studies from the >US and Britain on the vaccine. > >Until this year, the researchers themselves freely admitted it was a >rather poor vaccine. All the docs on the website just go into detail >about these issues. Why would DOD use it? We may not second-guess them >accurately, but some possibilities are these: > >1. They have to look like they are doing SOMETHING to counterract the >threat of biowarfare. > >2. Since the Army's biodefense program has probably spent over a >billion dollars, there have to be some results (vaccines) that can be >used. > >3. [Sabre rattling] Saddam needs to be made to think we think we have >good protection, so we won't be afraid to bomb and invade him even if he >uses anthrax. (This is a dumb argument as we don't claim to have >vaccines for his other bioweapons.) > >4. DOD has plans for a multibillion dollar program to develop over ten >new biowarfare vaccines to be used on all servicemembers. $150 million >has already been allocated, a new industry is growing up to absorb this >gravy, and anthrax immunizations need to proceed so as not to throw a >monkey wrench into the development of this program. People like Col. >David Franz have already left the military (Fort Detrick's biodefense >program in Frederick MD) to seek military contracts for private industry >(in Frederick MD). > >Meryl Nass, M.D. >Parkview Hospital, Brunswick, Maine 04011 >email mnass@igc.apc.org >phone (207) 865-0875 >fax (207) 865-6975 > > >*************************************************************** >Karin Schumacher >Vaccine Information & Awareness (VIA) >12799 La Tortola >San Diego, CA 92129 >619-484-3197 (phone/voicemail) >619-484-1187 (fax) >via@access1.net (email) >http://www.909shot.com (NVIC website) >http://www.access1.net/via (VIA website) >*************************************************************** >We Must Have The Freedom To Choose & Respect Everyone's Choice >*************************************************************** >Any information obtained here is not to be construed as medical >OR legal advice. The decision to vaccinate and how you >implement that decision is yours and yours alone. >***************************************************************